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JURISDICTION OF THE COURT
This case is before the Supreme Court pursuant to a Writ
of Certiorari to review a decision of the Court of Appeals
which affirmed the Third District Court's dismissal of Sandy
City's action seeking an extraordinary writ.
has

jurisdiction

over

this

matter

The Supreme Court

pursuant

to

Utah

Code

78-2-2(5) and Rule 46 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.
ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
The following issues are presented for review:
1.

Whether the District Court correctly held that the

approval by Salt Lake County of the construction of a Chevron
service

station

was

not

urban

development

under

Utah

Code

10-2-418.
2.

Whether the District Court correctly decided that

Sandy City did not express a willingness to annex the Chevron
property prior to approval by Salt Lake County of the Chevron
conditional use permit.
3-

Whether the District Court correctly held that Salt

Lake County complied with its zoning ordinance in the approval
of the Chevron development.
4.

Whether the Court of Appeals correctly upheld the

decision of the District Court.
All issues are matters of law subject to review by this
Court for correctness.**

Madsen v. Borthick, 769 P.2d 245 (Ut. 1988).

STATEMENT OF DETERMINATIVE STATUTORY AND
ORDINANCE PROVISIONS
The relevant statutory and ordinance provisions for this
ppeal are:
1.

Utah Code 10-2-418 (1979), which reads as follows:

"Urban development shall not be approved or
permitted within one-half mile of a municipality
in
the
unincorporated
territory
which
the
municipality has proposed for municipal expansion
in its policy declaration, if a municipality is
willing to annex the territory proposed for such
development under the standards and requirements
set forth in this chapter; provided, however, that
a property owner desiring to develop or improve
property within the said one-half mile area may
notify the municipality in writing of said desire
and identify with particularity all legal and
factual barriers preventing an annexation to the
municipality. At the end of 12 consecutive months
from the filing with the municipality of said
notice and after a good faith and diligent effort
by said property owner to annex, said property
owner may develop as otherwise permitted by law.
Urban development beyond one-half mile of a
municipality may be restricted or an impact
statement required when agreed to in an interlocal
agreement, under the provisions of the Interlocal
Cooperation Act.
2.

Utah

Code

10-1-104(11)

(1979),

which

reads

as

follows:
"(11)
'Urban
development'
means
a
housing
subdivision involving more than 15 residential
units with an average of less than one acre per
residential unit or a commercial or industrial
development for which cost projections exceed
$750,000 for any or all phases."
3.

Section 19.84.090 of the Salt Lake County Code of

Ordinances 1986, which reads as follows:
"Conditions for approval. The planning commission
shall not authorize a conditional use permit
unless the evidence presented is such as to
establish:
-2-

A. That the proposed use at the particular
location is necessary or desirable to provide a
service or facility which will contribute to the
general well-being of the neighborhood and the
community; and,
B. That such use will not, under the circumstances of the particular case, be detrimental to
the health, safety or general welfare of persons
residing or working in the vicinity, or injurious
to property or improvements in the vicinity; and,
C.
That the proposed use will comply with
the regulations and conditions specified in this
title for such use; and,
D. That the proposed use will conform to the
intent of the county master plan.
Sections

17-27-5,

17-27-11, and

17-27-13

of

the Utah

Code are attached as Addendum D.
Sections
Senate Bill

17-27-102

103, Planning

and

17-27-301(1)(b)

and Zoning

and

(2)(e) of

Revisions, 1991 General

Session, are attached as Addendum E.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
I.

NATURE OF THE CASE AND DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT.
In

November

of

1987, Sandy

City

("Sandy")

filed

a

complaint in the Third District Court seeking an extraordinary
writ, declaratory and injunctive relief, to void the approval
by Salt Lake County ("County") of a conditional use permit for
a Chevron service station on 0.7 acres of land located at 10600
South

and 1300 East

in the unincorporated

area of Salt Lake

County.*
The complaint seeks to have Chevron remove all buildings
constructed

on the property or to require

it to comply with

annexation laws and bring the property into compliance with the

1

R-2-34.
-3-

mdy

City

Development

Code.

The

complaint

also

attacks

an

arlier decision of the County to rezone for commercial use a
arger parcel of approximately 4.18 acres, hereinafter referred
o as the "original parcel," which includes the Chevron parcel.
In addition to Salt Lake County and the Salt Lake County
banning

Commission,

defendants

include

Chevron,

31ecker, Inc., Yeates, Priest, Kjar and Smoot.
ieveloper

of the station

Chevron's

agent

in the

at

issue.

land

Chevron is the

Postero-Blecker

acquisition.

Postero-

acted as

Defendants Yeates,

Priest, Kjar and Smoot were the owners of the original parcel.
Motions

for

defendants

in

motion

summary

for

summary

January

of

judgment

1988. 2

judgment3

and

were

Sandy

filed

also

a motion

filed

to

strike

by

all

its

own

certain

affidavits and other documents filed by Chevron.4
On February

5, 1988, the Court

heard

summary judgment and the motion to strike.

the motions

At the hearing Salt

Lake County filed with the Court the certified
Salt

Lake

Commission
the

zoning

County

Planning

proceedings
for

regarding

the original

2

R-75, 125, 155.

3

R-151.

4

R-173.

Commission
the

parcel. 5

J

for

and

Salt

Chevron
Sandy

record of the
Lake

County

application
objected

and

to the

The certified administrative record is contained in
Envelopes 1 through 6. Each envelope includes a numbered index
of the documents within the envelope. The Chevron record is in
Envelopes 3 and 4; the McDonald's record is in Envelopes 1 and
2; and the zoning of the original parcel is in Envelopes 5 and
6.
-4-

certification of the record.
by the Court.

The Motion to Strike was denied

All other motions were taken under advisement by

the Court.6
At a subsequent hearing held on February 9, 1988, the
District Court allowed Sandy to include in the administrative
record

all

of

development

the

which,

County
by

the

files
time

on
of

McDonald's
the

restaurant

hearing,

had

been

approved by the County on a parcel adjacent to the Chevron
parcel.7
On March 15, 1988, the Court filed a Memorandum Decision
granting defendants' motion for summary judgment and denying
Sandy's motion for summary judgment.8

On April 8, 1988, the

Court entered its Order of Judgment and Dismissal.9
On June
decision

of

7, 1990, the Court

the

District

Court.10

of Appeals
Sandy's

affirmed

the

petition

for

rehearing before the Court of Appeals was denied.
All defendants except Salt Lake County and the Salt Lake
County

Planning

Commission were dismissed

from the

suit in

October of 1990 pursuant to a settlement agreement with Sandy.
II.

STATEMENT OF UNDISPUTED FACTS.
1.

In

April

of

1987,

Chevron's

predecessors

in

interest, Priest, Yeates, Kjar and Smoot (sellers), applied to

R-219.
R-252.
R-259, Addendum A.
R-2 65, Addendum B.
Addendum C.
-5-

It Lake County to have approximately 4.18
cated

on

the northwest

corner

of

the

intersection

ist and 10600 South in the unincorporated
)unty zoned from Residential R-l-8
to

Residential

acres of property
of

1300

area of Salt Lake

(8,000 square foot single

amily

lots)

RM-ZC

(office)

and

Commercial

-211.

The ZC designation attached certain conditions limiting

he height of buildings and the nature of uses that could be
leveloped on the original property. *
2.

The original property is located within the Little

Cottonwood

Master

County Master

Plan Area

Plan.

which

The master

is

part

of

the

Salt

Lake

plan, which was published

in

1976, consists of 91 pages of text and includes a map of the
area covered by the plan. 13
3.

After

recommended
zoning

be

to

hearing

the

Board

approved.

recommendation

to

the matter, the Planning

The
which

of

County

County

Commissioners

staff

Sandy

Commission
that

asked

Sandy

replied. 14

No

the

for

a

Sandy

representative attended the hearing. 15
4.

On

Commissioners

August
heard

5,

1987,

the matter. 16

the

of

County

Notice of the hearing

11

R-209.

12

R-179.

13

Envelope 3, Document 11.

14

R-248, Envelope 6, Document 2.

15

R-109.

16

Envelope 5, Document 6.
-6-

Board

was

published

and

representative

posted
of

as

Sandy

required
attended

law. 17

by
the

conclusion of the hearing, the Board

Again,

hearing. 18

of County

At

nc
the

Commissioners

approved the zoning change. 19
5.
asking

On

the

September

Board

of

zone

the

decision

to

petition

asked

that

family dwellings.

18,

County

1987,

Commissioners

original
the

Sandy

parcel

property

be

filed
to

petition

reconsider

RM-ZC

and

zoned

back

The request was based

a

its

C-2. 2 0
for

The
single

in part on the fact

that any new commercial development in the county would compete
with Sandy*s shopping center immediately to the east. 2 1

Sandy

also objected because its master plan only allowed commercial
development on one corner of an intersection and it had already
approved

commercial

happened

to be in Sandy City. 22

Board

of

County

development

Commissioners

on the

On September
denied

reconsider the zoning.2^

17 Envelope 5, Documents 2 and 3.
18 R-109.
19 R-102.
20 R-25.
21 R-25-26.
22 R-26.
23 Envelope 5, Document 9.

-7-

adjacent

Sandy's

corner

which

18, 1987, the
petition

to

6.

On August

evron,

applied

for

26, 1987, Postero-Blecker,
a conditional

use

permit

as

agent

for

to

build

the

evron station on 0.7 acres of the original parcel. 24
7.

The County Planning Commission

iptember

22,

1987,

at

which

)ncerning the application.25
Dunty

Planning

Commission

time

heard the matter on

evidence

was

presented

The matter was continued by the

until

October

13, 1987, at which

ime the application was approved after additional evidence was
resented. 26
8.

Evidence presented at the County Planning Commission

learings included the following:
A.

Strong support for the application by residents

)f the area. 27
B..

Testimony

by

representatives

of

Chevron

of a

need for the service in the area. 28
C.

Recommendations for preliminary approval by the

County planning staff subject to certain conditions. 29

24

R-20.

25

R-107-111.

26

R-112-115.

27

R-110, 111.

28

R-113.

29

R-108.

-8-

D.
the

White

Testimony

City

in support of the application fror

Community

Council

and

from

the

Unitec

Association of Community Councils.30
E.

Testimony from Chevron officials estimating the

cost of the project as $175,000.31
F.

Favorable recommendations from the County Board

of Health, the Fire Department, the Flood Control Division, the
Planning staff, and other agencies.32
G.

An appraisal filed by Sandy estimating that the

"market value" of the Chevron development was between $660,000
and

$760,000,

including

the

land,

site

and

improvements, tenant finish, fixtures and equipment.

building
Of that

amount, land was valued at $210,000.00.33
9.

The Planning Commission made specific findings of

fact concerning the issues involved in the application.

The

Planning Commission specifically found that the application was
consistent with the Little Cottonwood District Development Plan
and would provide a needed service for the area.34

30

R-110.

31

R-108.

32

Envelope 3, Document 2.

33

R-133, Envelope 3.

34

R-116, Addendum F.

-9-

10.

On

October

21,

1987,

the

Board

of

County

mmissioners upheld the County Planning Commission decision by
nying the appeal of Sandy City. 35
11.

On September 30, 1987, McDonald's Corporation filed

i application for a McDonald's restaurant on a parcel of land
.thin the original property adjacent to the Chevron parcel. 36
I October

27, 1987, the County Planning

le application, 37

On December

Commission

approved

9, 1987, the Board of County

^mmissioners upheld the decision of the Planning Commission. 38
12.

The

Chevron

conditional

use

application

rocessed separately from any other development
ounty

requirements

independently

from

was

and meets all

any other

otential development within the original property.

existing

or

y

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
The issues in this case have been reviewed by the County
banning

Commission,

the

Board

of

County

)istrict Court, and the Court of Appeals.
approval

of

the

Chevron

station

has

been

Commissioners,

the

At every level the
upheld.

Judicial

review of a zoning decision is limited to a determination of
whether

there

is

a

reasonable

basis

35 Envelope 3, Document 4.
36 R-168.
37 R-167.
38 R-242.
39 R-180, Envelope 3.

-10-

for

the

decision.

The

judicial review is based on the administrative record and i!
not de novo.
In this case, the record supports the approval of th«
Chevron

station by

the County

Planning

Commission.

By its

prior approval of a major mall immediately across 1300 East,
Sandy changed the character of the area and therefore it was
well

within

the

discretion

of

the

Planning

Commission

tc

interpret the intent of the County Master Plan on the basis of
the present development pattern in the area.
The
service

District

station

10-2-418.

Only

Court

is

not

when

correctly
urban

the

held

development

projected

costs

that

the

Chevron

under

Utah

of

commercial

a

Code

development exceed $750,000 for any or all phases is the County
statutorily limited in its ability to approve the development.
Cost projections for the Chevron development should not include
the costs of the McDonald's development

and other potential

developments on adjacent parcels which have no relationship to
Chevron other than the fact they were divided from the same
original parcel as the Chevron parcel.
purposes

of

§418

should

not

include

Projected costs for
land,

tenant

finish,

equipment, and personal property.
If land cost alone is excluded from the evidence of cost
projections for the Chevron development submitted by Sandy, the
cost projections fall far under the $750,000 figure.
The District Court also correctly held that Sandy failed
to express a willingness to annex the property as required by

-11-

L8.

The statute requires a willingness to annex the property

addition to the enactment of a policy declaration covering
e area.

ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE CHEVRON DEVELOPMENT IS NOT URBAN
DEVELOPMENT UNDER UTAH CODE 10-2-418.
LEGISLATIVE INTENT.
Sandy argues that cities, not counties, should provide
micipal-type services and therefore "cost projections" for a
svelopment should include all expenses that in any way relate
)

the

development

covisions

of

the

project.

This

annexation

position

statute

3verning powers of cities and counties.
*gislation

for

planning

and

zoning40

and

ignores
other

many

statutes

The County's enabling
specifically

provides

hat counties may plan and provide for business and industrial
evelopment.
rovide

uses

industry."41
Ian

One of the purposes of a county master plan is to
of

land

for

"urbanization,"

"trade"

and

The Act provides that counties adopt a zoning

for the unincorporated

trade" and "industry,"42

county which

includes

The purpose of zoning

40

Utah Code 17-21-1 through 27.

41

Utah Code 17-27-5.

42

Utah Code 17-27-11.

-12-

uses for

regulations

for

the

county

include

"the

protection

of

both

urban

anc

nonurban development." 43
The

enabling

act

for

planning

and

zoning

in

counties

preceded the enactment of Utah Code 10-2-418 in 1979; however,
the

1991 Legislature

The

new

legislation

recodified
actually

legislation.44

this enabling
strengthens

the

authority

of

counties to provide for business and industrial development and
the protection of urban development.
Cities
legislature

and

almost

municipal-type

counties

also

identical

services. 46

J

have

been

powers with
The

granted

regard

legislature

has

to

by

the

providing

specifically

dealt with the "double taxation" issue since the enactment of
Chapter 2 of Title 10 in 1979. 4 7

43
44

Utah Code 17-27-13.

Senate Bill 103.
103 is July 1, 1992.

The effective date of Senate Bill

45

Senate Bill 103.
17-27-102,
(2)(e); Attachment E to this brief.

17-27-301(1)(b)

and

46

Utah
Code
17-5-1
through
17-5-88,
Powers
and
Authorities of Counties; Utah Code 17-34-1 through 17-34-5,
Municipal Services to Unincorporated Areas; Utah Code 10-8-1
through 10-8-89, Powers and Authorities of Cities; Mountain
States Telephone v. Salt Lake County, 702 P.2d 113 (Ut. 1985)
cited by Sandy has no relevancy to the authority of counties to
provide services. The holding was limited to a determination
that counties have no authority to provide a business license
tax.
47 Amendments to Utah Code 17-34-2 and 17-34-4 in 1982
and 1985 require separate budgets for municipal-type services
provided to unincorporated areas.
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Legislative policy makes it clear that the legislature
bended a balanced approach to annexation, contrary to Sandy's
sition that the legislature intended urban development should
construed as broadly as possible to force all commercial and
dustrial

development

cities.48

into

If

nted to prevent counties from approving
mmercial

development

ecifically
ncern

adjacent

prohibited

about

to

counties

nonconforming

uses

the

legislature

any industrial or

cities,

it

from

doing

cannot

be

could
so.

taken

have

Sandy's
seriously

nee annexation of the Chevron parcel is contingent upon Sandy
:panding the commercial area approved by the County.49
The point is that legislative intent with regard to the
waning of urban development should not be interpreted on the
isis of any one statement of policy since Utah law expresses a
imber

of

inexation

different
and

policies

development.

and

requirements

Rather,

the

that

govern

legislative

intent

ith regard to how costs should be determined should be based
i the purpose of §418 and the practical considerations in the
^plication of the law.

q

° 10-2-401(6).
"Decisions with respect to municipal
Dundaries and urban development need to be made with adequate
Dnsideration of the effect of proposed actions on adjacent
reas and the interests of all other governmental entities, on
he need for and the cost of local government services and the
bility to deliver the services under the proposed actions, and
n factors related to population growth and density and the
eography of the area."
49

See the Suggestion of Mootness filed by County.
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B.

THE
PROJECTED
COSTS
OF
A
DEVELOPMENT
SHOULD Bl
DETERMINED INDEPENDENTLY OF COSTS FOR OTHER ADJACEN'
DEVELOPMENTS.
(1)

THE ZONING PROCESS IS NOT THE APPROPRIATE TIME T<
DETERMINE THE COSTS FOR A PROPOSED DEVELOPMENT.

Sandy now contends that the zoning process
appropriate

time

to

raise

issues

concerning

is not th<

the

costs

oi

development because it was impossible to estimate such costs a\
the time of zoning. 50

The County agrees.

In this case, the zoning of the original property, th*
approval of the Chevron development and the subsequent approval
of the McDonald's development all occurred within the same year
and therefore

some knowledge was

available

during

the zoninc

process as to what developments might ultimately occur on the
original property.

However, often the zoning of land and the

subsequent sale and development of various parcels may be years
apart.

In such cases it would be pure speculation for a county

or a city to estimate the costs of any development other than
at the time the specific development

is being considered

for

approval.
In
potential

this

case,

developments

using
on

Sandy's

theory

the original

of

property

combining

the

together

and

It is ironic Sandy now takes this position since in
the Court of Appeals Sandy attempted to tie the Chevron
development to the McDonald's development by contending that
"The property owner's entire development was laid out and
presented to the County at the time that the commercial zoning
was requested." Sandy Reply Brief in the Court of Appeals, p.
12.
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eluding land, fixtures, equipment, personal property, etc. as
Dsts," Sandy could have filed suit at the time the property
3 rezoned.

However,

requiring

that

projected

costs

of a

velopment be determined at the time of zoning would establish
unworkable rule of law.51

On the same basis, requiring that

e projected costs for all future developments on different
reels divided from the same original parcel be determined at
e

time

of

development

of

the

first

parcel

would

also

tablish an unworkable rule of law.
Even in cases where the plans for an adjacent commercial
velopment

are

known

velopment, there

at

is no

the

assurance

velopment will be approved.
(2)

the

that

first

the

commercial

later proposed

2

THE CHEVRON DEVELOPMENT
MCDONALD#s DEVELOPMENT.

The record
>proved

time of

IS

SEPARATE

FROM

THE

is clear that the Chevron development was

separately

from

the

later-approved

McDonald's

ivelopment and from any future potential development of the
:her

parcel

of

land

within

the

original

property.

No

negation is made by Sandy that the Chevron development by
D1

The Court of Appeals decision should be upheld but not
i the basis assigned in Point II of the Court's opinion where
ie Court of Appeals held that challenges to cost projections
ider §418 should be made at the time of rezoning of the
coperty. The County urges adoption of the holding of the
istrict Court that §418 is not applicable to this case.
Many commercial uses under the County zoning ordinance
re conditional uses which the Planning Commission may deny.
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itself fails to meet any County zoning ordinance requiremen
such as acreage, parking or yard spaces.

Yet Sandy contend:

that the Chevron development must be lumped together with tin
McDonald's and other potential developments located within th<
original parcel as multiple phases of one development.53
County

submits

provisions.

Sandy

misconstrues

the

applicable

Th<

statutor]

Utah Code 10-2-418 as pertinent reads as follows:

Urban development shall not be
approved or permitted within one-half
mile
of
a
municipality
in
the
unincorporated
territory
which
the
municipality has proposed for municipal
expansion in its policy declaration. If
a municipality is willing to annex the
territory proposed for such development
under the standards and requirements set
forth in this chapter;....
The

term

"urban

development"

is

defined

in

Utah

Code

10-1-104(11) which states:
"Urban
development"
means
a
housing subdivision involving more than
15 residential units with an average of
less than one acre per residential unit,
or a commercial or industrial development for which cost projections exceed
$750,000 for any or all phases.
A

phased

development

is where

one

developer

obtains

approval and builds an integrated development over time.
management,

parking,

amenities

phases are interrelated.

and

design

of

the

The

different

In such a case, the County would have

53 Sandy emphasizes the fact that the fee title in the
parcels had not been transferred to Chevron and McDonald's at
the time of the applications. However, the record establishes
that McDonald's and Chevron purchased the respective parcels.
R-180; McDonald's Record R-101, 105-115.
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2 ability to estimate the costs of future phases of an entire
/elopment at the time it reviews the plans for the first
ase.

That

is

not

the

situation

when

the

adjacent

yelopments are related only by the fact that they have been
rved out of the same original parcel.

The County has no way

computing the estimated costs of potential nearby commercial
velopments as part of the process of estimating the cost of
e first development.
Sandy contends
mmercial

division

the Chevron development
of

the

original

is part

parcel.

However,

gislature has specifically excluded commercial

of a
the

subdivisions

om the definition of subdivisions in the enabling legislation
ich

permits

counties

to

regulate

subdivision

approval. *

ndy makes no contention herein that the development required
bdivision approval.
Also persuasive is the fact that the legislature, in
ifining urban development
irm

"subdivision"

only

in Section 10-1-104(11), used the
in

defining

urban

development

for

irposes of residential development.

The term "subdivision" is

>t

commercial

included

in

a

definition

of

or

industrial

54 ..."Subdivision" means the division of a tract or lot
: parcel of land into three or more lots, plats, sites or
:her divisions of land for the purpose, whether immediate or
lture of sale or building development; provided that this
^finition shall not include a bona fide division or partition
E agricultural
land
for
agricultural
purposes
or of
pmmercial, manufacturing or industrial land for commercial,
anufacturing or industrial purposes.... Utah Code 17-27-27.
Emphasis added.)
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development and therefore a "commercial subdivision" should no
be considered a phased development under §418.
C.

THE PURPOSE AND PRACTICAL OPERATION OF SECTION 41
REQUIRE THAT LAND COSTS, TENANT FINISH, EQUIPMENT AN
PERSONAL PROPERTY NOT BE INCLUDED AS PROJECTED COSTS.
(1)
In

LAND COSTS.
determining

legislative

intent

type of costs that should be included
the

costs

exceed

of

an

$750,000,

considered. 55

industrial
the

or

with

in calculating

commercial

purpose

of

regard

the

to

whethe

development

statute

th

should

wil
b

The purpose of §418 is to limit the authority o

counties to approve large industrial or commercial development!
that could
want

to

affect the planning

annex

in the

future.

for an area which
It

a city ma:

is the development

of th<

land, not the land itself, that affects planning decisions anc
impacts

an

"development"

area.

The

relates

ordinary
to

character of the land. 56

understanding

construction

which

of

the

terr

changes

th«

To "develop" a parcel of ground means

to "build" upon the ground. 57
In addition, the wording of Utah Code 10-1-104(1) does
support

the position

that

land value

at the time

a proposec

Parson Asphalt Products. Inc. v. Utah State Tax Comm.,
617 P.2d 397 (Ut. 1980); Intermountain Smelting Corp. v.
Capitano, 610 P.2d 334 (Ut. 1980).
56

City of Louisville v. District Court. Cty. of Boulder,
543 P.2d 67 (Colo. 1975).
57

Scheller v. Dixie Six Corp., 753 P.2d

1988) .
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971

(Ut. App.

'elopment is being reviewed by a county should be included in
:ermining
itute

"cost

uses

projections"

the

term

for

"cost,"

a development.

and

not

"value,"

Since
the

the

dollar

>unt applicable to the land would vary greatly depending on
in the current developer purchased the land.

If the land had

sn owned by the developer for a long period of time, the cost
*ely would be much less than the cost of the same piece of
id purchased
3

there

recently.

is

no

Often the developer

actual

purchase

cost

leases the land

or

the

proposed

velopment may involve an expansion of an existing development
t involving any additional land.
Thus,

if

ojections, the

land

cost

is

result would

included

for

determining

be arbitrary, depending

cost

on the

te and the nature of the land transaction and the nature of
e development.
If the cost of the land is over $750,000, nothing could
done with the land without annexing to a city.

On the other

nd, if the cost of land is minimal because it has been owned
r a long period of time or has been inherited or leased, a
ivelopment costing in excess of $700,000 can be placed on the
ircel

without

triggering

the

annexation

requirement,

igislation should not be given an interpretation that leads to
)surd results. ^

58 Durfey v. Bd. of Education
LSt. , 604 P.2d 480 (Ut. 1979).
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of

Wayne

County

School

Presumably, if the legislature had intended land valu<
to be part of the cost of development, it would have used th(
term "value" and not "cost."

Also, the legislature used th<

term "cost projections," which implies a future cost and noi
one that may already had been incurred years before the time ol
the proposed development.
Excluding the value of land from Sandy's own appraisal
for

the

Chevron

development,

the

projection

cost

of

the

development would be between $450,000 and $550,000.
(2) TENANT FINISH, EQUIPMENT AND PERSONAL PROPERTY.
Another rule of statutory interpretation that is helpful
in this case is that in determining

legislative intent, the

practical operation of the statute should be considered.59

The

time at which a county has to make a decision as to whether a
proposed

office

or

commercial

development" is when the developer
develop.

development
applies

is

"urban

for a permit to

In addition, the permitting process is the time when

the county has the opportunity to determine the projected cost
of a development by reviewing the plans for a development.
In many
county

to

cases

determine

it would
what

be pure

kind

of

speculation

internal

tenant

for the
finish,

equipment and personal property will end up in an office or
commercial development.

For instance, when the county reviews

D

* State v. Salt Lake City Bd. of Education, 13 U.2d 56,
368 P.2d 468 (Ut. 1962).
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application for an office building, the owner may not have
ased the offices.

How the offices will be furnished and

lipped is later decided by each tenant after the building has
sn approved and constructed and the offices leased,
A more specific example would be a small office building
r doctors or dentists.

Depending on the kind of doctor or

ntist who leases the office space, the cost of the equipment
uld vary substantially.

The situation may well be the same

th a small commercial development.
Also,

as

in

the

case

of

raw

land,

tenant

finish,

uipment and personal property have no impact on land use for
L area that a city may want to annex in the future.
To permit counties

to apply §418 in a consistent and

janingful manner in determining whether there is authority to
;sue a permit for a proposed development, speculative costs
ich as tenant finish, equipment and personal property should
)t be included.

The county may be able to estimate such costs

i some cases but in many others this would not be possible,
le kinds of costs that must be projected for purposes of §418
tiould not vary from case to case or there will always be
Dtential

litigation

between

cities

and

counties

concerning

hether a certain kind of cost is projectable at the time the
ounty reviews a project.
In order to have a consistent and meaningful standard,
he projected
hould

be

the

costs

of

a development

development

costs

-22-

for

for
the

purposes

of

construction

§418
of

buildings

and

site

improvements.

They

are

the

costs the

result in improvements which have an impact on an area ar
which are reasonably determinable by a county during the permi
process.
POINT II
SANDY DID NOT EXPRESS A WILLINGNESS TO
ANNEX.
Section

10-2-418

restricts

"urban

development" withi

one-half mile of a municipality where the property involved i
"in the unincorporated

territory which the municipality ha

proposed for municipal expansion in its policy declaration, i
the municipality is willing to annex the territory...."

Sand;

argues that the inclusion of the Chevron parcel within the are;
of

its master

amended

policy

declaration

adopted

in 1983 meets this requirement.

in

1979

and lasl

The District Court

correctly held otherwise.
Sandy's

argument

willingness-to-annex

would

standard

make

under

surplusage

§418.

General

of

the

rules of

statutory construction require all language in a statute should
be given effect.60

If a policy declaration, which must include

a "map or legal description of the unincorporated

territory

into which the municipality anticipates or favors expansion of
its boundaries,"61

in itself

sufficed, a separate

DU

statutory

Grant v. Utah State Land Board, 26 U.2d 100, 485 P.2d
1035 (1971).
61

Utah Code 10-2-414(1).
-23-

uirement of willingness to annex would be unnecessary.

The

ter policy declaration enacted by Sandy City is not directed
any particular
eel may

annexation.

occur years

laration

and

ncil. 6 2

may

The annexation of a particular

after

enactment

involve

Accordingly,

an

§418

of

the master

entirely
requires

policy

different
an

city

independent

• ression of a willingness to annex by a city council at the
le the property is being considered for development.
The only binding

form that the required willingness to

lex could take is a resolution enacted by the city council in
:ice

at

the

time

the

property

is

being

considered

for

relopment.
POINT III
THE RECORD SUPPORTS THE DECISION OF THE
DISTRICT COURT UPHOLDING THE COUNTY'S
APPROVAL OF THE CHEVRON CONDITIONAL USE
PERMIT.
JUDICIAL REVIEW IN THIS CASE IS LIMITED TO A DETERMINATION BY THE COURT THAT THERE IS EVIDENCE IN THE RECORD
DEMONSTRATING A REASONABLE BASIS IN SUPPORT OF THE
DECISION OF THE PLANNING COMMISSION APPROVING THE CHEVRON
CONDITIONAL USE PERMIT.
The Utah Supreme Court has held on a number of occasions
at
cal

the

court

will

jurisdictions

not

interfere

unless

there

with
is

zoning
no

decisions

reasonable

of

basis

A city council enacting a master policy declaration
•uld not bind future city councils with regard to a particular
mexation.
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whatsoever

to

justify

the

decision

and

therefore

the

actio

must be regarded as arbitrary and capricious. 63
This same standard has been applied to judicial revie
of the approval of a conditional use permit. 64
Judicial
board,

through

review
an

of

a

action

decision

seeking

an

by

a

local

governmen

extraordinary

writ, i

limited to a determination of whether the local board exceedei
its

jurisdiction

decision. 65

or

abused

its

descretion

in

rendering

it:

Such a review is on the record and the complaining

party is not entitled to a de novo trial. 66
Sandy

claims

the

"arbitrary

and

capricious"

standarc

should not apply because in Sandy's opinion the approval of the
development

violated

county

ordinances

Planning Commisson exceeded its authority.
the

question.

violated
plans

issue

is whether

the county ordinances.

and

agencies

The

ordinances
and

is

employees

the

and

the

This position begs

the Chevron

development

The interpretation of zoning

responsibility

having

therefore

the

of

authority

local
to

zoning

enact

and

63

Marshall v. Salt Lake City. 141 P.2d 704 (Ut. 1943);
Naylor v. Salt Lake Citv Corp., 410 P.2d 764 (Ut. 1966); Dowse
v. Salt Lake Citv Corp., 255 P.2d 723 (Ut. 1953); Gavland v.
Salt Lake County, 358 P.2d 633 (Ut. 1961).
64

Cottonwood Heights Citizens Assn v. Board of County
Commissioners of Salt Lake County, 593 P.2d 138 (Ut. 1979).
65
66

Rule 65B(b)(2) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.

Peatross
(Ut. 1976).

v. Board

of County
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Comm'rs., 555 P.2d

281

inister such plans6' and courts defer to the interpretation
the

local

agency

unless

the

decision

is

arbitrary

and

ricious.68
APPROVAL OF THE CHEVRON STATION WAS CONSISTENT WITH THE
COUNTY ZONING ORDINANCE.
The Planning Commission made specific findings that the
svron

application

proval

of

linance.69

a

met

all

conditional

The

record

of
use

supports

the

required

under
these

the

criteria
county

findings-

for

zoning

There is

stimony in the record from Chevron representatives as to the
rket

need

for

a

service

station

in

the

area

and

from

sidents in the area supporting the desirability for a service
ation.

There are favorable recommendations from the County

re Department, Health Department, Flood Control Division and
her agencies.
an.

The County Traffic Engineer approved the site

There is also a favorable recommendation from the County

velopment
>propriately

Services
buffer

jvelopment in the area.

Division
the

setting

station

from

conditions
the

which

residential

This evidence supports the finding of

le Planning Commission that the development will provide a

b/

The
Planning
Commission
and
Board
of
County
Dmmissioners are responsible for enactment and amendment of
Dunty master plans and zoning ordinances. Utah Code §§17-27-4
tirough 17-27-65; 17-27-11; 17-27-14.
68

Cascade Broadcasting Corp. v. Groener, 626 P.2d 386
Dr. App. 1981); Robert L. Rieke Bldq. Co., Inc. v. City of
verland Park, 657 P.2d 1121 (Kansas 1983).
69

R-116-117.
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service to the community and will not be detrimental to tl
area.
The Planning Commission finding that the development i
consistent with the intent of the Little Cottonwood Distric
Master Plan is supported by a number of provisions in the pic
itself.70

The Little Cottonwood District Master Plan contair

both a short

term

and

a long

term element-

The plan wa

approved in 1976 with a primary emphasis on development throug
1985.

MP2.

It is not intended

as a firm guide for ever

development and more intensive uses may be appropriate in th
long

term.

development
adjacent

to

MP3-5.
should

The

take

existing

plan

place

provides

at

that

commercia

intersections

(MP41) an

development.

MP10.

The

propose^

development is consistent with all of those standards in tin
plan.
Since 1976, a great amount of growth has taken place ii
the southern part of the county including a major commercia]
development
Chevron

and

approved

by

McDonald's

Sandy

across

the

developments.71

street
This

from

growth,

the
ir

addition to Sandy's approval of commercial development across
the street, constituted a de facto amendment of the master plan
which should be interpreted on the basis of today's factual

/u

The Little Cottonwood District Development Plan is
contained in the record in Envelope 3, number 11. Citations to
the master plan will be designated in this brief as MP and the
appropriate page number.
71 R-242, 243, comments of County Planning Director.
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nation. 72

This

Court

has

specifically

held

that

local

ing bodies can take into consideration changed circumstances
ce the adoption of

a master

plan

in reviewing

a proposed

elopment. 73
No serious argument can be made that the Chevron parcel
Id have been developed in any manner other than commercial.
POINT IV
SUMMARY JUDGMENT WAS PROPER IN THIS CASE.
Sandy
positions
ler

to

argues that
and

conduct

extensive

in

>ceeding, Sandy has no right to conduct such discovery.

More

the

record

and

review

case

novo

upon

judicial

this

de

based

Since

in

this

is

evidence.

discovery

to take

in

:ter

develop

it should have been allowed

is

not

a

?ortantly, Sandy's contention that there are factual

issues

dispute is based solely upon Sandy's own version of the law
Lch the District Court correctly rejected.

If land costs and

sts of other proposed developments within the original parcel
e excluded from cost projections, then the evidence submitted
om both Sandy and Chevron showed the Chevron development to
less than $750,000.
When

the

is case, there

District
remained

Court
no

resolved

relevant

the

factual

legal

issues

disputes.

in
The

72 Naylor v. Salt Lake City Corp., supra; Town of Bedford
Mt. Kesco, 33 N.Y.S.2d 178, 306 N.E.2d 155 (1973); Bone v.
ty of Lewiston, 693 P.2d 1046 (Id. 1984).
73

Naylor v. Salt Lake City Corp., supra.
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County submits that the District Court correctly resolved tl
legal issues and, therefore, summary judgment was appropriate.
CONCLUSION
For
submits

the

the

reasons

decisions

set
of

forth

the

herein,

District

Salt

Court

Lake Count
and

Court o

Appeals should be upheld.
DATED this 21st day of May, 1991.
DAVID E. YOCOM
Salt Lake County Attorney

By_

/*£~^f J

N£U*^

KENT S. LEWIS
Deputy County Attorney
Attorneys for Appellees
[R1227]
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I caused
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Walter R. Miller
Sandy City Attorney
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Sandy, Utah 84070
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Salt Lake County Utah

, MAR 151988
<"*+

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DIS'T^CT*
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

SANDY CITY, a municipal
corporation of the State of
Utah,

MEMORANDUM DECISION
CIVIL NO. C-87-7304

Plaintiff,
vs.
SALT LAKE COUNTY, a political
subdivision of the State of
Utah, et al.,
Defendants,

Plaintiff's and defendants1

Motions

for Summary Judc

came before this Court on the 5th day of February, 1988.
parties were represented by respective counsel.
the Court took the matter under advisement.

After argum

On the 25th da

February, 1988, Salt Lake County's Motion for Certificatioi
Record

came before this Court.

The matter was taken u

advisement, subject to plaintiff supplementing the record.

A

reviewing the file, Memoranda, record and arguments, the C<
finds as follows.
1.

Salt Lake County Commission acted properly in rezoi

the property in question, and was not in violation of any coi
ordinance or county master plan, and did not act arbitrarily
capriciously.

Furthermore, Sandy City appears to have waived

right to object to rezoning.

2.

Salt

Lake

MEMORANDUM DECISION

PAGE TWO

kNDY CITY V. COUNTY

County

Planning

Commission

and

Salt

Lake

ounty Commission properly issued a conditional use permit for
evelopment of the subject property.
acts,

is necessary

general welfare.
icted properly

The project, based on the

and desirable, and not detrimental to the

Furthermore, the defendant Chevron Incorporated
in processing

its application

through the only

)ody with jurisdiction at the time, Salt Lake County.

Sandy City

lid not have jurisdiction to accept the application.
Defendants1

3.

actions

do

not

violate

Utah

Code

Ann.,

Section 10-2-418.
(a)

Defendants1 development does not constitute "urban

development" proposed within a restricted, unincorporated area.
(b)

Sandy City has not clearly stated it would annex

the subject property, but only that it will consider annexation.
It was not until the present lawsuit was filed that it indicated
that

it

would

annex

the

petitioned

for annexation

assurance

Sandy

City

subject

property.

Even

if

Chevron

and Sandy City annexed, there is no

would

approve

Chevronfs

application.

Furthermore, Chevron is not required to petition Sandy City for
annexation.
(c)

The value of the fixtures and personal

should not be considered.

The projected

property

cost of the proposed

service station project is under $750,000.00.

Furthermore, the

application of Chevron should be considered a single development.

V. s./ W

.-.* ~

+J
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Even if Chevron's application were not considi

a single development, and were combined with McDonald's proj<
the project will still not exceed $750,000,00.
(e)
procedures

At this time

Chevron has taken all the necesj

for approval of their application, and is ready

proceed with their project.
4.
Salt

Based on the facts before the Court, it appears 1

Lake

County

Commission

has

conducted

comported with all due process requirements.

a

hearing 1

It appears to 1

acted within the scope of its authority, has conducted hearii
and arrived at a decision, and does not appear to have acted
excess of its authority, or in a manner so clearly outside rea
that

its

action

must

be

deemed

capricious

and

arbitra

Peatross v. Board of Commissioners of Salt Lake City, 555 I
231 (1976).
5.

Accordingly, it is the opinion of this Court that Sa

City's Motion to Strike should be denied, and Sandy City's Mot
for Summary Judgment should be denied.

Furthermore, all of

defendants' Motions for Summary Judgment and Salt Lake Count
Motion

for

Certification

should

be

granted.

Counsel

defendant Chevron is to prepare an Order for the Court's

oc

ionature.

Said Order should be approved as to for. »V .11

arties.
Dated this.

/^TZ3'

day

of March, 1988.

RAYMOND S. UNO
DISTRICT COURT JUDGE
-••V i

<

- k .

I

H.|DiXC;-iH:?i::-,_£Y

By

<kz*^M^ASUl^.^.
*^, «J:'f"«i. > C : t I
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I hereby
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following, this
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that I mailed a true and correct coi

Memorandum
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MEMORANDUM DEC

Decision,

postage

prepaid,

to

day of March, 1988:
8TATE OF UTAH
)
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE S8
I, THE UND€*8»GNfiO. CLERK OF

Walter R. Miller
Attorney for Plaintiff
440 East 8680 South
Sandy, Utah
84070

COURT OF SA^T LAKE COUNTY UTA
CERTIFY THAT THE AMNEXEO AND F
A TRUE AND FULL COPY OF AN OR
MENT ON RLE IfiWY OFFICE

WITNESS m
trW^^HW
Kent S. Lewis
THIS
J
J
—
jD*Y
dF & U /
Deputy County Attorney
K
h DIXON HM^EYj CL&W
Attorney for Salt Lake County Defendants*
2001 S. State, Suite S3600
Salt Lake City, Utah
84190-1200

Leonard J. Lewis
John W. Andrews
Attorneys for Defendant Chevron
50 S. Main, Suite 1600
P.O. Box 45340
Salt Lake City, Utah
84145
Brinton R. Burbidge
Attorney for Defendants Yeates, Priest,
Kjar and Smoot
330 South 300 East
Salt Lake City, Utah
84111-2599

K\mm

0C!J

FILED IN CLERKS OFFICE
Salt Lake County uiah
VAN COTT, BAGLEY, CORNWALL & MCCARTHY
Leonard J. Lewis, #1947
John W. Andrews,
#4724
Attorneys for Chevron USA, Inc.
50 South Main Street, Suite 1600
P. 0. Box 45340
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145
Telephone: (801) 532-3333
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
SANDY CITY, a municipal
corporation of the State
of Utah,
Plaintiff,

ORDER AND JUDGMENT OF
DISMISSAL

vs.
Civil No. C87-7304
SALT LAKE COUNTY, a political
subdivision of the State of
Utah* SALT LAKE COUNTY
PLANNING COMMISSION, K.
DELYN YEATES, R. SCOTT
PRIEST, W. SCOTT KJAR,
STEVEN E. SMOOT, POSTEROBLECKER, INC., and CHEVRON
U.S.A., INC.,

Honorable Raymond Uno

Defendants.
The following matters came on for hearing before the
Honorable Raymond S. Uno, District Judge, on Friday, the 5th
day of February 1988, at 2:00 p.m.: (1) Defendant Chevron
U.S.A., Inc.'s Motion For Summary Judgment; (2) Defendants Salt
Lake County and Salt Lake County Planning Commission's Motion
For Summary Judgment; (3) Defendants Smoot, Kjar, Priest and
Yeates' Motion For Summary Judgment; (4) Plaintiff Sandy City's

Dn For Summary Judgment; and (5) Plaintiff Sandy City's
Dn To Strike.

Leonard J. Lewis and John W. Andrews

ared on behalf of defendant Chevron U.S.A., Inc.; Kent S.
s appeared on behalf of defendants Salt Lake County and
Lake County Planning Commission; Brinton R. Burbidge
ared on behalf of defendants Smoot, Kjar, Priest and
es; and Walter R. Miller appeared on behalf of plaintiff
ly City.
The Court having reviewed the record and the memoranda
arguments of the parties, and good cause appearing, it is
>by ORDERED, ADJUDGED and DECREED as follows:
(1)

Plaintiff Sandy City's Motion For Summary

gment and Motion To Strike are denied;
(2)

It appearing that no material issues of fact

st, and that defendants are entitled to judgment as a matter
law, defendants' Motions For Summary Judgment are hereby
nted.

It is hereby ordered that the Verified Complaint of

dy City in this action and all causes of action contained
rein be stricken, and this action be and hereby is dismissed
:h prejudice,

.wday of April, 1988.

DATED this ;£

BY THE COURT:

ATTEST

* . DIXON HiNpLSY
f'>'•

''•"l.Af.liy"iii/JJ^

l-T"'""t

^ ^ ^ ^ w ^ ^ / ^ ^ ^ ^ f t - ^
Raymond S. Uno

uep^TS" District Judge

2

"

0GC266

APPROVED AS TO FORM:

VAN OOTT, BAGLETPT CORNWALL
& MCCARTHY
Leonard J. Lewis, Esq.
John W. Andrews, Esq.
Attorneys for Defendant
Chevron U.S.A.,Inc.
50 South Main Street, Suite 1600
P . O . Box 45340
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145

Walter R. Miller, Esq.
Sandy City Attorney
Attorney for Plaintiff
440 East 8680 South
Sandy, Utah 84070

^K

Kent S. Lewis, Esq.
Deputy County Attorney
Attorney for Salt Lake County
Defendants
2001 South State Street
#53600
Salt Lake City, Utah 84190-1200

. .'"

<*<

Brinton R. Burbidge, Esq.
KIRTON, McCONKIE & BUSHNELL
Attorneys for Defendants
Smoot, Kjar, Priest and Yeate;
330 South 300 East
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111

5747A
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present sufficient evidence to sustain the
convictions. However, in light of the detailed findings of fact of the trial judge, all
of which find support in the record, we find
this claim to be without merit.
Affirmed.
HOWE, Associate C.J., and DURHAM
and ZIMMERMAN, JJ., concur.
STEWART, J., concurs in the result.

SANDY CITY, a municipal corporation,
Plaintiff and Appellant,
v.
SALT LAKE COUNTY, a political subdivision of the State of Utah; Salt Lake
County Planning Commission; K. Delyn Yeates; R. Scott Priest; W. Scott
Kjar, Steven E. Smoot; Postero-Blecker, Inc.; and Chevron U.S.A., Inc., Defendants and Appellees.
No. 880429-CA.
Court of Appeals of Utah.
June 7, 1990.
Municipal corporation brought action
against county, developers and property
owners challenging issuance of conditional
use permit to allow service station to be
built on rezoned property. The Third District Court, Salt Lake County, Raymond S.
Uno, J., dismissed city's action, and city
appealed. The Court of Appeals, Garff, J.,
held that allowing administrative record to
be submitted at hearing for motion for
summary judgment rather than beforehand
was not abuse of discretion; (2) affidavits
produced in support of motion for summary judgment had adequate evidentiary
foundations; (3) city was not entitled to
motion for continuance to obtain further
discovery; and (4) as result of failure to
object to urban development at time of

zoning determination, city was precluded
:rom raising issue on appeal.
Affirmed.
Bench, J., concurred in result.
1. Appeal and Error <S=>934(1), 1024.4
In reviewing summary judgment, appellate court considers evidence in light
most favorable to losing party and affirms
only if it appears that no genuine dispute
exists as to any material issues of fact or,
if moving party is entitled to judgment as
matter of law, even according to facts as
contended by losing party.
2. Zoning and Planning <s=»618
Courts of law cannot substitute judgment in area of zoning regulations for that
of municipality's governing body.
3. Zoning and Planning <©»601, 614
Courts will not consider wisdom, necessity, or advisability or otherwise interfere
with municipality's zoning determination
unless it is shown that no reasonable basis
to justify action taken exists.
4. Zoning and Planning <s=>642
If administrative record of zoning procedure has been preserved, matter will be
reviewed on record and de novo trial is
inappropriate. U.C.A.1953, 10-9-15.
5. Zoning and Planning <s=>625
Any error in admitting administrative
record of zoning procedure during hearing
on motion for summary judgment, rather
than before, was harmless because record
was essentially cumulative with respect to
evidence already before court.
6. Zoning and Planning <s»643
Admitting administrative record of
zoning procedure at time of trial was within discretion of trial court, absent showing
that party lacked actual notice and time to
prepare to meet questions raised by admitted documents. Rules Civ.Proc, Rule 6(d).
7. Judgment <3»185.1(8)
Affidavit which does not meet requirements for admission as evidence is subject
to motion to strike since inadmissible evi-
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dence cannot be considered in ruling on
motion for summary judgment Rules Civ.
Proc, Rules 6(d), 56, 56(e).
8. Judgment e=»l85.3(1)
Affidavits presented by county in support of granting conditional use permit
were admissible as portions of administrative record before county planning commission and were not subject to motion to
strike. Rules Civ.Proc, Rule 56(e, f);
Rules of Evid., Rules 902(4), 1005.
9. Judgment e=»186
Motions under rule allowing court to
continue summary judgment motions to
permit moving party to obtain further discovery should be granted liberally to provide adequate opportunity for any genuine
^ issues of fact to be discovered; further
discovery, however, will not be allowed if
parties did not diligently pursue discovery.
Rules Civ.Proc, Rule 56(f).
10. Judgment <s=>186
In order to be entitled to continuance
of summary judgment motion to complete
discovery, movant must file affidavit to
preserve contention that judgment should
be delayed pending further discover}*,
which affidavit must explain how requested continuance would aid opposition to
summarv judgment. Rules Civ.Proc, Rule
56(f).
11. Judgment <s=186
Evidence presented in affidavit in support of motion to continue summary judgment motion to allow further discovery indicated further discovery would produce
only cumulative evidence and that movant
lacked due diligence, and, thus, movant
was not entitled to continuance. Rules Civ.
Proc, Rule 56(f).
12. Zoning and Planning <s=»644
Evidence in zoning record supported
findings that projected cost of development
project and proposed development were in
compliance with county master plan and
county ordinances.
13. Zoning and Planning <3=>572
Even though city in master policy declaration had indicated interest in annexing
property if property owners petitioned,

property owners never petitioned nor did
city attempt to annex property on its own,
and, thus, city was precluded from raising
annexation issue. U.C.A.1953, 10-2-414,
10-2-418, 10-9-9.
14. Zoning and Planning $=>572
Municipal corporation failed to object
to urban development at time zoning determination was made and, thus, was precluded from challenging issuance of conditional
use permit under development U.C.A.
1953, 10-1-104, 10-1-104(11), 10-2-414, 102-418.
Walter R. Miller, Sandy, for plaintiff and
appellant.
Brinton R. Burbidge, Kirton, McConkie
& Bushnell, Salt Lake City, for defendants
and appellees Yeates, Priest, Kjar, Smoot
and Postero-Blecker, Inc.
Leonard J. Lewis, Salt Lake City, for
defendant and appellee Chevron U.S.A.,
Inc.
Kent S. Lewis, Salt Lake City, for defendant and appellee Salt Lake County.
Before BENCH, GARFF and
JACKSON, JJ.
OPINION
GARFF, Judge:
Plaintiff Sandy City appeals the trial
court's dismissal of its action against defendants Salt Lake County, property owners Yeates, Priest, Kjar, and Smoot, and
developers Postero-Blecker, Inc. (PosteroBlecker) and Chevron USA, Inc. (Chevron).
We affirm the trial court's dismissal of
Sandy City's action.
This action involves a 4.18-acre parcel of
commercial property located on the northwest corner of 10600 South and 1300 East
in unincorporated Salt Lake County. The
property abuts Sandy City's boundaries
and is located within an unincorporated "island" within Sandy City's limits. Since
1976, the county master plan and Sandy
City plans have called for rural residential
uses of the property.
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In 1979, Sandy City adopted a general
annexation policy declaration which, among
other things, delineated twenty-one unincorporated islands within the city boundaries which Sandy City was willing to annex, including the present parcel. According to Sandy City, this policy declaration
requires property owners to first attempt
to annex to Sandy City, thereby obviating
the County's approval for development of
commercial property when the development
cost is in excess of $750,000.
On August 5, 1987, at the property owners' request, the Salt Lake County Commission, without amending its master plan,
adopted a zoning ordinance which permitted commercial development on the present
property. Sandy City objected to the rezoning but failed to appeal the decision.1
On August 26, 1987, Postero-Blecker,
the agent for the property owners and
Chevron, applied to Salt Lake County for a
conditional use permit to build a Chevron
service station, car wash, and mini-convenience store on .7 acres of the property.
This application indicated that the estimated value of the project was $250,000. The
property owners also intended to build a
McDonald's restaurant on the property.
On September 30, 1987, they filed another
conditional use permit application which
valued the McDonald's project at approximately $300,000. The property owners did
not petition to annex the property to Sandy
City.

October 14, 1987, Sandy City appealed this
decision. The Salt Lake County Planning
Commission, following several public hearings, denied Sandy City's appeal and entered findings of fact.
Sandy City then appealed the conditional
use decision to the Salt Lake County Commission, which held a hearing on December
9,1987. The Salt Lake County Commission
affirmed the Salt Lake County Planning
Commission's grant of the Chevron conditional use permit, finding that the required
statutory procedure had been followed and
that the grant of the conditional use permit
was in the community's interest. Sandy
City then brought this action in the district
court.
On January 18, 1988, Salt Lake County
filed with the district court the affidavit of
Helen Christiansen, the Salt Lake Planning
Commission's administrative assistant, and
the minutes of the Salt Lake County Planning Commission's September 22 and October 13, 1987 meetings, at which Chevron's
conditional use permit application had been
discussed and interested parties had
presented evidence. Subsequently, Sandy
City submitted an affidavit indicating that
the projected cost of the Chevron development was between $660,000 to $760,000,
and that the cost of the McDonald's development would be between $900,000 and
$1,100,000. Simultaneously, Salt Lake
County submitted the minutes of the April
28, 1987 meeting of the Salt Lake County
Planning Commission, which involved discussion of the zoning change, along with
Helen Christiansen's authenticating affidavit. All parties moved for summary judgment.

On September 18, 1987, Sandy City protested the Chevron application, indicating
that "Sandy City is currently considering
annexation of the property and the annexation will require an independent consideration of proper zoning for this property." It
also unsuccessfully petitioned the Salt
Lake County Commission to reconsider and
amend its previously passed zoning ordinance.
On October 13, 1987, the Salt Lake County Planning Commission approved the
Chevron conditional use application. On

Sandy City then moved to strike Salt
Lake County's affidavits, alleging that they
failed to conform to the requirements of
rule 56(e) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. Chevron responded by filing an affidavit indicating that the building value of
the proposed Chevron station was $175,000.

1. Under Utah Code Ann. § 17-27-16 (1987), an
appeal from a zoning decision must be made
within the time and according to the procedure
specified by the board of county commissioners.

While these regulations are not a part of this
record, there is no dispute that Sandy City failed
to appeal the rezoning pursuant to these regulations.
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On February 4, 1988, the day before the
hearing on Salt Lake County's motion for
summary judgment, Sandy City's attorney
moved /or additional discovery time pursuant to rule 56(f) of the Utah Rules of Civil
Procedure.
I
During the hearing on February 5, 1988,
Salt Lake County requested permission to
introduce into evidence the certified record
of the administrative hearings. These
records included the previously submitted
commission minutes, with additional maps
and supporting materials. Sandy City's
counsel objected, stating that he did not
know what the administrative record contained and, thus, the record was prejudicial.
The district court overruled Sandy City's
objection and allowed the record to be enWed into evidence. On February 19, 1988,
Salt Lake County submitted the minutes of
the December 9, 1987 meeting of the Salt
Lake County Commission,. containing the
appeal of the conditional use permit grant,
along with the administrative assistant's
supporting affidavit.
Salt Lake County filed the complete certified administrative record with the district court on March 3, 1988. On March 15,
1988, the district court entered its decision,
finding that the Salt Lake County Planning
Commission had properly issued the conditional use permit, and that defendants' actions did not violate the annexation statute,
Utah Code Ann. § 10-2-418 (1986). It
granted summary judgment in favor of defendants and dismissed Sandy City's action.
Subsequently, Sandy City unsuccessfully
moved for an injunction on the development of the property during the pendency
of the appeal. It then brought this appeal.
On appeal, Sandy City challenges the
summary judgment, first arguing that
there were substantial issues of material
fact making summary judgment improper
because: tl) Salt Lake County untimely
submitted the administrative record in violation of rule 6(d) of the Utah Rules of Civil
Procedure; (2) Salt Lake County's administrative record and affidavits were untimely
• Sandy City relies upon annexation statutes
and characterizes some of the issues as annexation-related, however this appeal is from the

filed in violation of rule 56 of the Utah
Rules of Civil Procedure; (3) the affidavits
and other evidence presented by Chevron
violated rule 56(e) of the Utah Rules of
Civil Procedure by lacking an adequate evidentiary foundation; (4) the trial court
erred in refusing to grant Sandy City's rule
56(f) motion for further discovery; and (5)
there were substantial issues of material
fact in the record. Sandy City's second
major assignment of error is that the trial
court erroneously interpreted Utah Code
Ann. §§ 10-2-418 and 10-1-104(11) (1986)
by ruling that (1) to preclude urban development of the property at issue, Sandy City
had to formally declare its intention to annex it prior to the occurrence of the events
leading to this lawsuit, and (2) the Chevron
development, and possibly the McDonald's
development, did not constitute "urban development" under section 10-1-104(11).
I. FACTUAL AND
EVIDENTIARY ISSUES
Before we address Sandy City's contentions, however, it is necessary to examine
the scope of our review in cases dealing
with summary judgment and municipal
zoning issues.2
[1] In reviewing a summary judgment,
an appellate court "considers] the evidence
in the light most favorable to the losing
party, and affirmfs] only where it appears
there is no genuine dispute as to any material issues of fact, or where, even according
to the facts as contended by the losing
party, the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Briggs v. Hoicomb, 740 P.2d 281, 283 (Utah CtApp.
1987).
[2,3] It is well established in Utah that
"courts of law cannot substitute their judgment ' n ^ p a r p a n"f ?nnincr roonilatinnc fnr
tha<
bod
16 —
, —
, -. ,.„_,

(footnote omitted). Instead, the courts afford a comparatively wide latitude of disgrant of a conditional use permit, a zoning
function.
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cretion to administrative bodies charged
with the responsibility of zoning, as well as
endowing their actions with a presumption
of correctness and validity, because of the
complexity of factors involved in the matter of zoning and the specialized knowledge
of the administrative body. Cottonwood
Heights Citizen Ass'n v. Board of
Comm'rs, 593 P.2d 138, 140 (Utah 1979).
Thus, the courts will not consider the
wisdom, necessity, or advisability or otherwise interfere with a zoning determination
unless "it is shown that there is no reasonable basis to justify the action taken." Id.

reviewed on the record, and that a de novo
trial is inappropriate.
Under these standards of review, we now
examine Sandy City's claims that the trial
court improperly granted summary judgment on evidentiary issues.
A.

Admission
of
Administrative
Record
First, Sandy City alleges that Salt Lake
County untimely submitted the administrative record in violation of rule 6(d) of the
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. It argues
that rule 6(d) requires supporting affidavits
to be submitted at the time a party files a
motion for summary judgment, and that
the administrative record is analogous to a
supporting affidavit. Because the County
submitted the administrative record during
the hearing on the motion for summary
judgment, rather than beforehand, and,
consequently, failed to give Sandy City notice of the contents of the record, Sandy
City concludes that the trial court should
not have considered the evidence contained
in this record in arriving at its summary
judgment. On the other hand, the County
argues that the Rules of Civil Procedure do
not set forth any specific procedure for
certifying an administrative record from a
county commission to the district court, so
rule 6(d) is inapplicable here because it
deals only with the filing of affidavits.

[4] In a zoning action, Utah Code Ann.
§ 10-9-15 (1986) indicates that an aggrieved party may "maintain a plenary action
for relief from any decision of the municipal body within thirty days of the filing of
the decision. The Utah Supreme Court
stated that "[t]he statutory language 'plenary action for relief therefrom ' presupposes the continued existence of the administrative action, thus suggesting an appeal
rather than a trial de novo." Xanthos v.
Board of Adjustment, 685 P.2d 1032, 1034
(Utah 1984). However, "[t]he nature and
extent of the review depends on what happened below as reflected by a true record
of the proceedings, viewed in the light of
accepted due process requirements." Denver & Rio Grande W. R.R. Co. v. Central
Weber Sewer Improvement Dist., 4 Utah
2d 105, 287 P.2d 884, 887 (1955). The suIn relevant part, rule 6(d) states:
preme court also found, in Xanthos, that
When a motion is supported by an affidawhere a hearing has proceeded in accordvit, the affidavit shall be served with the
ance with due process requirements, the
motion; and, except as otherwise providreviewing court can look only to the record,
ed in Rule 59(c), opposing affidavits may
which consists of the hearing minutes
be served not later than 1 day before the
along with the formal findings and order.
hearing, unless the court permits them to
Xanthos, 685 P.2d at 1034. However,
be served at some other time.
where no record is preserved, and there is,
[5] Prior to the hearing before the disconsequently, nothing to review, the re- trict court on February 5,1988, the County
viewing court may take evidence. Id. submitted the minutes of the Salt Lake
While this evidence is not necessarily limit- County Planning Commission hearings held
ed to the evidence presented below, the on April 28, May 12, September 22, October
reviewing court may not retry the case on 13, and October 27, 1987, along with authe merits or substitute its judgment for
thenticating affidavits. These minutes conthat of the municipal body. Id.
tained testimony on all of the disputed isBecause an administrative record has sues. The record which the County moved
been preserved in the present circum- to be placed into evidence during the disstance, we find that this matter should be trict court hearing contained these minutes,
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accompanied by some documentation and a sary." Jensen v. Eames, 30 Utah 2d 423,
large quantity of plat maps, but did not add 519 P.2d 236, 238 (1974) (footnote omitted);
materially to the relevant information al- see also Western States Thrift & Loan Co.
ready before the court. The court admit- v. Blomquist, 29 Utah 2d 58, 504 P.2d 1019,
ted this record into evidence over the stren- 1021 (1972); Bairas v. Johnson, 13 Utah 2d
uous objections of Sandy City, stating that 269, 373 P.2d 375, 378-79 (1962).
"everything down there is not essential to
Although Sandy City objected to the ada determination of these motions. And I
mission of the administrative record on the
think that quite apart from this, [even] if
ground that it did not know what it conthe court disregarded this, it will have betained and, therefore, was unprepared to
fore it sufficient undisputed facts of law to
argue against it, the trial court properly
make decisions in the matter." Subsedenied this objection because the entire
quently, the court admitted into evidence,
as part of the record, the minutes of the record was a matter of public record, had
Salt Lake County Commission hearing held been on file for a substantial period of time
on December 9, 1987, which had not previ- prior to the hearing, and both parties had
ously been available, and various doc- access to it. Further, significant portions
uments that were specifically requested by of the record, in the form of the commission minutes, were already before the court
Sandy City's attorney.
and Sandy City had ample opportunity to
Our review of the record, including the
become familiar with them. We find no
administrative record submitted to the
abuse of discretion in the court's ruling.
court, indicates that if there was any error
in admitting the administrative record, it
was harmless because it was essentially
B. Adequate Evidentiary
Foundation
cumulative with respect to the evidence
Sandy City's next claim of error is that
already before the court. Further, some of
the affidavits and other evidence presented
the subsequently admitted evidence was
by Chevron and the other defendants vioadmitted at Sandy City's request.
late rule 56 of the Utah Rules of Civil
[6] However, we find that the trial Procedure because they lacked an adequate
court did not err in admitting the adminis- evidentiary foundation.
trative record at the time of trial. If we
follow rule 6(d) literally, styling the admin[7] The relevant portion of rule 56(e)
istrative record as the equivalent of an states that "[supporting and opposing affiaffidavit in support of a motion for summa- davits shall be made on personal knowlry judgment, the documents must be edge, shall set forth such facts as would be
served not later than one day before the admissible in evidence, and shall show afhearing unless the court permits them to firmatively that the affiant is competent to
be served at some other time. The court, testify to the matters stated therein." Intherefore, has discretion to admit such doc- admissible evidence cannot be considered in
uments at other times, including during the ruling on a motion for summary judgment,
hearing. In this case, the court admitted D & L Supply v. Saurini, 775 P.2d 420,
documents during and after the hearing, in 421 (Utah 1989); Creekview Apartments i\
response to requests made by both parties. State Farm Ins. Co., 771 P.2d 693, 695
However, there are limitations to this (Utah Ct.App.1989); so an affidavit which
discretion. Although the Utah Supreme does not meet the requirements of rule
Court has found that the notice provisions 56(e) is subject to a motion to strike. Howof rule 6(d) are not hard and fast, it has ick v. Bank of Salt Lake, 28 Utah 2d 64,
stated that a trial court may dispense with 498 P.2d 352, 353-54 (1972); see also Blomtechnical compliance to them only if there quist, 504 P.2d at 1020-21 (an affidavit
is satisfactory proof that a party had "actu- containing statements made only "on inforal notice and time to prepare to meet the mation and belief" is insufficient and will
questions raised by the motion of an adver- be disregarded).
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Sandy City moved to strike defendants'
affidavits for their failure to conform to
these requirements. In its motion to
strike, Sandy City attacked defendant
Chevron's memorandum in support of its
motion for summary judgment and the affidavit of Helen J. Christiansen, along with
its attached exhibits, to the extent that
they were used to establish the allegations
set forth in Chevron's memorandum.
[8] Helen J. Christiansen's affidavits
served to establish that she was the custodian of the record before the Salt Lake
County Planning Commission and that, on
the basis of her personal knowledge, the
hearing minutes and a copy of McDonald's
Corporation's application for a conditional
use permit were the correct records of the
Salt Lake County Planning Commission.
Under rules 902(4) and 1005 of the Utah
Rules of Evidence, public records are admissible as an exception to the general rule
excluding hearsay evidence if they are
"certified as correct by the custodian."
Utah R.Evid. 902(4). Therefore, Ms. Christiansen's affidavit conformed to rule 56(e)
with regard to the admission of the exhibits
as portions of the administrative record
before the Salt Lake County Planning Commission. As such, they are admissible evidence and are not subject to a motion to
strike.
Sandy City challenges various statements made in these minutes as being without evidentiary foundation. These allegations, however, go to the merits of granting the conditional use permit and not to
any procedural defects. Therefore, we are
not concerned with them under our standard of review. Consequently, we find
Sandy City's objections to the foundation of
statements made in the record to be without merit.
C. Further Discovery
[9] Sandy City argues that the district
court erred in refusing to permit it to conduct further discovery pursuant to rule
56(f) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.
Rule 56(f) provides that a court may continue a motion for summary judgment to permit the moving party to obtain affidavits or

take depositions. Hunt v. Hurst, 785 P.2d
414, 416 (Utah 1990). Rule 56(f) reads as
follows:
Should it appear from the affidavits of a
party opposing the motion that he cannot
for reasons stated present by affidavit
facts essential to justify his opposition,
the court may refuse the application for
judgment or may order a continuance to
permit affidavits to be obtained or depositions to be taken or discovery to be had
or may make such other order as is just.
It is generally held that rule 56(f) motions should be granted liberally to provide
adequate opportunity for discovery, Cox v.
Winters, 678 P.2d 311, 313 (Utah 1984),
Callioux v. Progressive Ins. Co., 745 P.2d
838, 841 (Utah Ct.App.1987) because information gained during discover}' may create
genuine issues of fact sufficient to defeat a
motion for summary judgment. Dovmtown Athletic Club v. Horman, 740 P.2d
275, 278 (Utah Ct.App.1987). However,
courts are unwilling to "spare the litigants
from their own lack of diligence," Callioux, 745 P.2d at 841 (quoting Hebert v.
Wicklund, 744 F.2d 218, 222 (1st Cir.1984)),
so do not grant rule 56(f) motions when
dilatory or lacking in merit. Reeves v. Geigy Pharmaceutical, Inc., 764 P.2d 636, 639
(Utah Ct.App.1988); Downtown Athletic
Club, 740 P.2d at 278-79.
[10] A rule 56(f) movant must file an
affidavit to preserve his or her contention
that summary judgment should be delayed
pending further discovery. Callioux, 745
P.2d at 841. In this affidavit, the movant
must explain how the requested continuance will aid his or her opposition to summary judgment. Id. The trial court has
discretion to determine whether the reasons stated in a rule 56(f) affidavit are
adequate. Reeves, 764 P.2d at 639.
[11] Sandy City filed an affidavit with
the court along with its rule 56(f) motion,
stating that it had been unable to take
defendants' depositions or to obtain a certified copy of certain county commission
minutes. It indicated that it wanted to
pursue additional discovery which would
show that: (1) the proposed use of the
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In determining if Sandy City's request
for further discovery was meritorious, we
first consider the relevant standard of review. As we noted above, in municipal
zoning decisions, the couris do not consider
the wisdom, necessity, or advisability of
particular actions. See Sandy City v. City
of South Jordan, 652 P.2d 1316, 1318-19
(Utah 1982). Instead, the reviewing court
may consider whether the municipality acted in conformance with its enabling statutes and ordinances pursuant to its comprehensive plan. Naylor v. Salt Lake City
Corp., 16 Utah 2d 192, 398 P.2d 27, 28-29
(1965). The court may not substitute its
judgment for that of the municipality on
the merits of these issues, however. Id. at
129.

property contradicted the county master
plan and that insufficient evidence had
been presented to the County Planning
Commission to demonstrate conformity
with the plan; (2) the proposed zoning
would not contribute to the general well-being of the neighborhood; (3) the proposed
use would be detrimental to the health,
safety, and general welfare of persons residing in the vicinity; (4) the true scope,
costs, and impact of the development was
not accurately and fully communicated to
the county officials during the decisionmaking process; and (5) the costs of the
development would substantially exceed
$750,000.
To determine whether this affidavit was
sufficient to merit a rule 56(f) continuance,
several factors must have been considered:
(1) Were the reasons articulated in the
Rule 56(f) affidavit "adequate" or is the
party against whom summary judgment
is sought merely on a "fishing expedition" for purely speculative facts after
substantial discover}' has been conducted
without producing any significant evidence? (2) Was there sufficient time
since the inception of the lawsuit for the
party against whom the summary judgment is sought to use discovery procedures, and thereby cross-examine the
moving party? (3) If discovery procedures were timely initiated, was the nonmoving party afforded an appropriate response?
Callioux, 745 P.2d at 841; see also Reeves,
764 P.2d at 639; Downtown Athletic Club,
740 P.2d at 278.

The trial record contained evidence as to
Salt Lake County's enabling statutes, ordinances, and plans. It also indicated that
the Salt Lake County Commission considered evidence with respect to all the
issues on which Sandy City wished to perform additional discovery. The Salt Lake
County Commission made findings of fact
going to the merits of these issues.3 Discovery relating to the merits of the issues
was improper under the standard of review, but could properly be held with respect to enabling statutes and procedural
issues. However, there was already substantial evidence on the record regarding
the relevant enabling statutes and plans.
Further, Sandy City did not allege in its
affidavit that it needed additional time to
discover procedural errors committed by

3. The Salt Lake County Commission findings
state, in part:
1. The estimated cost of the development is
approximately SI75,000....
2. This development is consistent with the
intent of the Salt Lake County Master Plan by
placing commercial development at major intersections within the county. The Little Cottonwood District Plan was generally intended
to be applicable through 1985 and the map is
now outdated in this immediate area. Since
the adoption of the plan in 1976, Sandy City
rezoned the northeast corner of 10600 South
1300 East to commercial, which changed the
character of the intersection. Additional
commercial development is now appropriate
at this intersection and is consistent with the
existing development approved by Sandy City.

3. The development will provide additional
gasoline services which are needed and desirable in the neighborhood and community
4. The development is buffered from adjacent residential uses by property zoned R-M
and will not be detrimental to the health,
safety or general welfare of persons residing
or working in the vicinity or injurious to
property or improvements in the vicinity.
The traffic engineer has reviewed and approved the application. Upon compliance
with the conditions required by the Planning
Commission, the development will be an attractive addition to the community.
5. The proposed use will comply with the
regulation and conditions of the Zoning Ordinance.
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Salt Lake County in granting the conditional building permit. Therefore, we find that
the trial court could reasonably conclude
that the reasons Sandy City articulated in
its affidavit would produce only cumulative
evidence and, so, were inadequate to merit
a continuance under rule 56(f).
Further, Sandy City had sufficient time
and opportunity during the pendency of the
action before the county commissions to
develop and present evidence in its favor
and to determine and refute the defendants' evidence. The record indicates that
on August 5, 1987, the Salt Lake County
Commission adopted the zoning ordinance
allowing commercial development on the
property at issue, following hearings on the
issue held in April and May of 1987. Sandy
City objected to the rezoning at this time
but failed to appeal. On August 26, 1987,
Postero-Blecker applied for the Chevron
conditional use permit. Sandy City protested the application on September 18, 1987,
and subsequently was involved in several
public hearings on the issue before both
the Salt Lake County Planning Commission
and the Salt Lake County Commission, at
which it had ample opportunity to present
evidence. Sandy City appealed to the district court in December 1987. The hearing
on the summary judgment motion was finally held on February 5, 1988, nearly a
year after the initial zoning hearings had
taken place. As stated previously, the
court will not use a rule 56(f) motion to
shield the movant from his or her lack of
diligence.
Finally, in a rule 56(f) motion,
[t]he mere averment of exclusive knowledge or control of the facts by the moving party is not adequate: the opposing
party must show to the best of his ability
what facts are within the movant's exclusive knowledge or control; what steps
have been taken to obtain the desired
information pursuant to discovery procedures under the Rules; and that he is
desirous of taking advantage of these
discovery procedures.
Callioux, 745 P.2d at 840-41 (quoting 2 J.
Moore, W. Taggart & J. Wicker, Moore's
' Federal Practice par. 56.24 (2nd ed. 1987)).

Sandy City's affidavit did not comply with
these requirements. Therefore, we conclude that the district court did not abuse
its discretion in denying Sandy City's rule
56(f) motion.
D.

Genuine Issues of Material Fact

Sandy City argues that the court failed
to consider evidence which created the following genuine issues of material fact: (1)
Sandy City's willingness to annex, as
shown by its express declaration in its annexation policy declaration and its attorney's statements before the Salt Lake
County Planning Commission; (2) that the
projected cost of the Chevron project exceeded 5750,000, as shown by a certified
appraisal setting the cost as between $660,000 and $760,000; (3) that the Chevron
station was only part of a larger scheme to
develop the 4.18-acre parcel, in that the
Chevron station would take only xh of the
parcel, the property owners' represented
that the property would be a "commercial
subdivision." and that they would be the
sole developers of the entire tract; (4) that
the cost for the entire development, excluding the cost of the land, would exceed
$750,000; and (5) the development was not
in compliance with the county master plan
and county ordinances which called for rural use of the subject property, and would
create traffic hazards and planning problems.
*N
[12] Many of these issues are actually
issues of law. The only issues of fact are
the projected cost of the project and whether the proposed development was in compliance with the county master plan and county ordinances. As we have noted above,
these issues were discussed and evidence
was presented before the county commissions, which entered written findings and
decided them on their merits. Because
their findings were supported by evidence,
we do not disturb them on review. See
USX Corp. v. Industrial Comm'n, 781
P.2d 883, 885-86 (Utah CtApp.1989) (administrative agency's factual findings will
not be disturbed unless they are "arbitrary
and capricious").
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II. LEGAL ISSUES
We next address Sandy City's contention
that the trial court erred in its interpretation and application of Utah Code Ann.
§ 10-2-418 (1986) and § 10-1-104(11)
(1986). Because summary judgment is
granted as a matter of law rather than
fact, the appellate court is free to reappraise the trial court's legal conclusions.
Bonham v. Morgan, 788 P.2d 497, 498
(Utah 1989) (per curiam); Parents Against
Drunk Drivers v. Graystone Pines Homeowner's Ass'n, 789 P.2d 52, 54 (Utah Ct.
App.1990); Western Fiberglass, Inc. v.
Kirton, McConkie & Bushnell, 789 P.2d
34, 35 (Utah Ct.App.1990).
A Annexation Procedure
Utah Code Ann. § 10-2-418 prohibits urban development "within one-half mile of a
municipality in the unincorporated territory
which the municipality has proposed for
municipal expansion in its policy declaration, if a municipality is willing to annex
the territory proposed for such development under the standards and requirements set forth in this chapter." (Emphasis added.) The parties disagree as to
whether Sandy City, to prevent urban development in the disputed territory, was
required under this statute to formally declare its intention to annex the territory
prior to the events leading to this lawsuit.
Utah Code Ann. § 10-2-414 (1986) requires a municipality, prior to annexing
unincorporated territory of more than five
acres, to adopt a policy declaration indicating the standard under which it is willing
to annex the territory. Sandy City argues
that it expressly declared its willingness to
annex the property before initiation of the
present lawsuit by (1) promulgating a general policy declaration indicating its willingness to annex the property, if petitioned,
along with twenty other parcels; and (2) its
counsel's direct statement to the Salt Lake
County Planning Commission that it was
willing to annex the property. The trial
court found that Sandy City was obliged to
4

« We note that the property at issue consists of
4
-18 acres while section *10-2-418 applies to
Parcels consisting of at least five acres. There-

make a formal declaration of intent to annex, in addition to its general policy declaration, to invoke the protection of section
10-2-414.
[13] Even though Sandy City, in its
master policy declaration, had indicated its
interest in annexing the property should
the property owners so petition, the property owners never petitioned, nor did Sandy
City attempt to annex the property on its
own. Further, it did not appeal the county's initial zoning decision pursuant to Utah
Code Ann. § 10-9-9 (1986), and raise this
issue at that time. Instead, it waited to
raise the issue on the subsequent grant of
the conditional use permit, where the relevant issues do not include the proposed use
of the land or any annexation issue, but
only whether the proposed use comports
with the previously enacted zoning regulations and county master plan. Because
Sandy City could and should have raised
this issue earlier, we find that it is precluded from raising it now. See Ringwood v.
Foreign Auto Works, 786 P.2d 1350, 1357
(Utah Ct.App.1990). As such, we do not
address the issue of whether Sandy City
was required under section 10-2-418, in
addition to its master policy declaration, to
officially declare its willingness to annex a
territory of less than five acres.4 Consequently, we find Sandy City's objection to
be without merit
We affirm the trial court's finding
against Sandy City on this issue, even
though we assign a totally different rationale than that used by the trial court. See,
e.g., Ostler v. Ostler, 789 P.2d 713, 716
(Utah Ct.App.1990).
B. Urban Development
Utah Code Ann. § 10-2-418 (1986) states
that "[ujrban development shall not be approved or permitted within one-half mile of
a municipality in the unincorporated area
which the municipality has proposed for
municipal expansion in its policy declaration.'* "Urban development" is defined in
Utah Code Ann. § 10-1-104(11) (1986) as
fore, section 10-2-418 would be inapplicable in
the present case.
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"a housing subdivision involving more than
15 residential units with an average of less
than one acre per residential unit or a
commercial or industrial development for
which cost projections exceed $750,000 for
any or all phases."
Pursuant to its objective of preventing
the proposed development of the disputed
territory, Sandy City argues that the trial
court erred in finding the value of the
proposed development did not exceed $750,000 because (1) the definition of "urban
development" under section 10-1-104 includes not only the value of the building
itself, but also the cost of the land and the
value of the building fixtures; and (2) the
$750,000 figure encompasses all commercial ventures to be built on the disputed
territory. Salt Lake County, on the other
hand, alleges that the only relevant cost
under the definition is that of the building
alone and does not include the land and
building fixtures, and that the $750,000 figure applies to each individual development
venture separately initiated on the property.
[14] Again, because Sandy City has not
made any attempt to annex the territory
and should have raised its objections to
urban development at the time of the zoning determination rather than at the subsequent granting of a conditional use permit,
we decline to interpret this statute. Because the interpretation of section 10-2414 would have no relevance to the propriety of the county's grant of a conditional
use permit under our standard of review,
any interpretation we would make would
be an advisory opinion, which we decline to
issue under well established standards of
judicial review. See Ringwood v. Foreign
Auto Works, Inc., 786 P.2d 1350, 1357
(Utah Ct.App.1990) (where the result in the
prior action constitutes the full relief available to the parties on the same claim, or
where the issue could and should have been
litigated in the prior action, the claim is
precluded under the doctrine of res judicata); Reynolds u Reynolds, 788 P.2d 1044,
1045 (Utah Ct.App.1990) (there is a longstanding judicial policy in Utah to avoid

advisory opinions). Therefore, we find this
issue to be without merit.
JACKSON, J., concurs.
BENCH, J., concurs in the result.
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John W. JARMAN and Helene B.
Jarman, Plaintiffs and Appellees,
v.
REAGAN OUTDOOR ADVERTISING
CO., Defendant and Appellant
No. 890106-CA.
Court of Appeals of Utah.
June 11, 1990.
Lessors brought action against outdoor advertising sign company seeking removal of signs that company had relocated
at request of state, which had acquired
right-of-way from lessors. The Third District Court, Summit County, Michael R.
Murphy, J., entered judgment in favor of
lessors, and sign company appealed. The
Court of Appeals, Garff, J., held that (1)
lease was ambiguous and, therefore, parok,
evidence was admissible to determine parties' intent, and (2) evidence supported determination that parties intended to continue sign company's right to maintain signs
only in their existing locations.
Affirmed.
1. Appeal and Error <s=>842(8)
Whether ambiguity exists in contract
is question of law reviewed for correctness.
2. Evidence <s»450(4)
Lease agreement relating to placement
of two outdoor advertising signs on property was ambiguous in relation to location of
signs, and thus parol evidence could be
accepted in determining intent of parties,

17-27-5. General purposes in making master
plan.
In the preparation of a county master plan, a
county planning commission shall make careful and
comprehensive surveys and studies of the existing
conditions and probable future growth of the territory
within its jurisdiction. The county master plan shall
be made with the general purpose of guiding and accomplishing a co-ordinated, adjusted, and harmonious development of the county which will, in accordance with present and future needs and resources,
best promote the health, safety, morals, order, convenience, prosperity, or the general welfare of the inhabitants, as well as efficiency and economy in the
process of development, including, amongst other
things, such distribution of population and of the uses
of land for urbanization, trade, industry, habitation,
recreation, agriculture, arboretum and other purposes, as will tend to create conditions favorable to
health, safety, energy conservation, transportation,
prosperity, civic activities, and recreational, educational and cultural opportunities; will tend to reduce
the wastes of physical, financial, or human resources
which result from either excessive congestion or excessive scattering of population; and will tend toward
an efficient and economical utilization, conservation
and production of the supply of food and water, and of
drainage, sanitary, and other facilities and resources.
1961

17-27-13. Purpose of regulations.
Such regulations shall be designed and enacted for
the purpose of promoting the health, safety, morals,
convenience, order, prosperity or welfare of the
present and future inhabitants of the state of Utah,
including, amongst other things, the lessening of congestion in the streets or roads or reducing the waste
of excessive amounts of roads, promoting energy conservation and greater utilization of solar and other
renewable energy sources, securing safety from fire
and other dangers, providing adequate light and air,
classification of land uses and distribution of land
development and utilization, protection of the tax
base, securing economy in governmental expenditures, fostering the state's agricultural and other industries, and the protection of both urban and nonurban development.
issi

17-27-11. Zoning districts — Regulation
From and after the time when the county p
commission of any county, in accordance v
procedure hereinabove specified, makes, adc
certifies to the board of county commissioner
or plans for zoning the unincorporated t
within any county, or any part thereof, in
both the full text of a zoning resolution and th
and after public hearing thereon, then the I:
commissioners, may by resolution regulate
portion or portions of such county which lie ou
cities and towns, the location, height, bulk ant
buildings and other structures, the percentag
which may be occupied, the size of yards, cou
other open spaces, the uses of buildings anc
tures for trade, industry, residence, recreation
activities or other purposes, access to sunlight
ergy devices, and the uses of land for trade, in
residence, recreation or other purposes. In o
accomplish such regulation, the board of count
missioners may divide the territory of the
which lies outside of cities and towns into d
and zones of such number, shape or area as
determine, and within such districts may re
the erection, construction, reconstruction, alt*
and uses of buildings and structures, and the
land, and may require and provide for the issui
building permits as a condition precedent to th
to erect, construct, reconstruct or alter any bi
or structure within any zone covered by such
resolution; provided* however, no permit shall 1
essary where the erection, construction, recor
tion or alteration of any building or struct
minor in character and will not substantial!)
the location, height, bulk or size of the build
other structure or the percentage of lot to be occ
The county planning commission may make ar
tify a single plan for the entire unincorporate
tion of the county, or separate and successive
for those parts which it deems to be urbanized oi
able for urban development and those parts whi
reason of distance from existing urban commu
or for other causes, it deems suitable for non
development; and any resolution adopted b;
board of county commissioners may cover and in
the unincorporated territory covered and incluc
any such single plan or in any such separate
successive plans. No resolution covering more o
than the territory covered by any such certified
mall, however, be adopted or put into effect unti
oniess it be first submitted to the county p\ai
commission which had certified the plan to the i
of county commissioners and be approved by
commission or, if disapproved, receive the favo
vote of not less than a majority of the entire mer
ship of such board. Ail such regulations shall be
form for each class or kind of buiiding or stru<
throughout any zone, but the regulations in am
zone may differ from those in other zones. Zo
unless county-wide, shall be limited to districts e
lished by the board of county commissioners, e
on petition as hereinbefore (hereinafter) providi
by direct action as hereinbefore provided.
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BEFORE THE SALT LAKE COUNTY PLANNING COMMISSION

In the Matter of a Conditional «
Use Application for a
:
Chevron Service Station
located at 10600 South
::
1300 East
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FINDINGS
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preliminary approval on September 22, 1987, of the captioned
conditional use application based upon the following findings:
1.
mately

The estimated cost of the development
$175,000,

which

excludes

the

is approxi-

development

requirements of Utah Code Annotated 10-2-418.

from

the

Land costs need

not be included in determination of cost.
2.
the

Salt

This development is consistent with the intent of
Lake

development

at

County
major

Master

Plan

intersections

by

within

placing
the

commercial

county.

Little Cottonwood District Plan was generally intended
applicable through 1985 and the map is now outdated
immediate area.

The
to be

in this

Since the adoption of the plan in 1976, Sandy

City rezoned the northeast corner of 10600 South 1300 East to
commercial, which changed

the character of the intersection.

Additional commercial development is now appropriate
intersection

and

is consistent with the existing

at this

commercial

development approved by Sandy City.

oo

3.

The

development

will

provide

additional

gasoline

fices which are needed and desirable in the neighborhood and
nunity.
vide

Several

additional

residents
services

stated
to

the

the
area.

development
The

would

White

City

munity Council recommended approval of the development.
4.

The

idential

development

uses

by

is

property

buffered

zoned

R-M

from
and

will

adjacent
not

be

rimental to the health, safety or general welfare of persons
liding or working in the vicinity or injurious to property or
movements

in

the

viewed and approved
»

conditions

vicinity.

The

the application.

required

by

the

traffic

engineer

has

Upon compliance with

Planning

Commission,

the

/elopment will be an attractive addition to the community.
5.

The proposed use will comply with the regulation and

nditions of the Zoning Ordinance.
DATED this

day of November, 1987.
SALT LAKE PLANNING COMMISSION

By.

lairman
3167+

-2-

000117

